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The global financial crisis is forcing Europe to become an ever closer 
union. Governments are still balking at the idea and many EU citizens 
continue to be rather sceptical. Yet the situation calls for a new ap-
proach to how we think about and do things. We believe that we need 
the United States of Europe. We also think that we need to fight for our 
future. It is surely detrimental to the democratic cause to give people 
the impression that policymaking consists of nothing more than a set 
of decisions to which there is no other alternative.
People in favour of the United States of Europe 
are usually motivated by pragmatism, not 
idealism. If European partners want to move 
ahead together, if they want to be stable in-
ternally and if they want to be in a position to 
take collective action externally, then embark-
ing on a close political union would seem to be 
dictated by reason. This is not currently being 
called into question by many Heads of State 
and Government, EU Commissioners, Mem-
bers of Parliament, academics and opinion 
leaders alike. But what kind of union are we 
talking about? We believe that by voicing sup-
port for the establishment of the United States 
of Europe, we are making a greater contribu-
tion to the much-needed democratic debate 
I
on the subject, than those who are given to 
talking about deeper integration or the advan-
tages of a political union. In a forthright de-
bate about the future, people who are against 
the establishment of the United States of Eu-
rope will be able to make their views heard 
and map out their proposed alternatives to 
the same extent as people, like us, who are 
very much in favour of the idea (annot. 1). 
In doing so, it would help to shed light on a 
democratic dispute between competing politi-
cal options. This would also refute the wide-
spread impression that policymaking consists 
of nothing more than a set of decisions, to 
which there is no other alternative.
Nowadays people who talk in a cautious way 
about a political union are often referring to 
the United States of Europe and are merely s
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II
Greater transparency and 
greater participation
Current advocates of the United States of Eu-
rope are right about one thing. This federation 
is not going to happen anytime soon. The path 
to this goal will be paved with acrimonious de-
bates, constitutional amendments and referen-
da. Those who are in favour of maintaining the 
status quo will no longer be able to bemoan a 
lack of transparency and the weak implementa-
tion of European decisions. On the other hand, 
those who are in favour of the federal United 
States of Europe can look forward to greater 
transparency, greater participation and more 
decision-making alternatives. This presup-
poses, of course, that these grand reforms will 
actually be introduced.
The Treaty of Lisbon makes it possible both 
in letter and in spirit to take the first tenta-
tive steps towards European federal unity. The 
Union, per Article 3, “shall promote economic, 
social and territorial cohesion and solidarity 
among Member States.” Article 4, which seems 
noteworthy, particularly in the current political 
context, goes even further stating; “the Mem-
ber States shall facilitate the achievement of 
the Union’s tasks and refrain (sic) from any 
measure which could jeopardise the attainment 
of the Union’s objectives.”
There are numerous occasions when one can 
and indeed one must employ the Treaty of Lis-
bon in order to improve the democratic nature 
of the Union and the degree of its integration. 
However, these methods alone are of limited 
use. This is because the Treaty of Lisbon, which, 
as we all know, was supposed to salvage what 
was left of the constitutional treaty, had defen-
sive undertones.
Moreover, the fiscal pact, which was hastily 
cobbled together as a result of pressure being 
exerted by the financial markets and the intro-
duction of the European semester with its (in-
dependent) coordination of national budgets by 
the Commission are steps in the right direction. 
However, the cumbersome way in which the fis-
afraid of calling it such, on account of its di-
visive connotations. A good example of this is 
Chancellor Merkel’s interview with the Süd-
deutsche Zeitung on 26 January 2012. When 
she was asked, “Is the United States of Europe 
part of your vision?” the Head of the German 
government replied: “my vision is of a politi-
cal union. Europe must follow its’ own unique 
path.” However, the Chancellor’s very next 
response outlined a blueprint for the United 
States of Europe. “In the course of a very long 
process we will hand over more competences 
to the Commission, which will then function 
as a European government when it comes to 
European matters. This includes a strong Par-
liament. The second chamber, as it were, is 
formed by the Council with the Heads of Gov-
ernment. And, last but not least, we have the 
European Court of Justice as a Supreme Court. 
At some stage in the future, Europe’s politi-
cal union might indeed look like that ...” (2).   
A federal two-chamber system with the Execu-
tive, the Legislative and the Judiciary having 
responsibility for selected “European matters” 
is what the Chancellor has in mind. The above, 
sets out what would be needed in terms of the 
institutions but provides no insight whatso-
ever into how they would interact or about the 
checks and balances that would be part and 
parcel of the democratic oversight of power.
German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle 
recently admitted that he wanted “to live long 
enough to witness the United States of Eu-
rope.” And his cabinet colleague Ursula von 
der Leyen has declared that her “goal is the 
United States of Europe.” (3) Thus leading 
members of the German government are fi-
nally catching up with former Belgian Prime 
Minister Guy Verhofstadt, who in 2005 wrote 
a manifesto in which he championed the estab-
lishment of the United States of Europe. This 
manifesto was written in conjunction with 
Altiero Spinelli (1907-86), an idealistic Ital-
ian pioneer of a federal Europe. The crisis has 
mercilessly exposed the weaknesses of the Eu-
ropean polity. We now need to talk about ways 
of overcoming them.s
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cal pact was compiled also illustrates the lim-
its of intergovernmental decision-making and 
what Angela Merkel calls the “Union method.” 
European economic government, which many 
believe to be a good idea, is not going to emerge 
in this manner. Not for the time being, at least.
An example of this is the following. The Europe-
an Central Bank, which is certainly a federal in-
stitution, is reliant on the good intentions of the 
Member States and on voluntary undertakings 
of 25 actors (as the UK and the Czech Republic 
are currently not participants) that they will ex-
ert some kind of self-discipline. As part of their 
routine, actors meet one another, express their 
views and reach agreement. The new European 
economic governance architecture is a sign that 
people have seen sense. It is definitely an im-
provement. But from a decision-making point 
of view, oversight by means of voluntary com-
mitments is simply an expression of weakness.   
You want to believe that States will adhere to 
their voluntary commitments, but you are dis-
trusting, unsure if they possess the requisite 
courage of convictions to do so. Not yet, at any 
rate. The situation was suitably summed up 
by the philosopher Jürgen Habermas in 2011, 
when he said that “there is a growing feel-
ing that the European treaties will have to be 
changed, but it is not quite clear what actually 
needs to be done.” (4) Proponents of the United 
States of Europe still have a long way to go.
III
It makes sense in a multi-polar 
21st century
Half-hearted pragmatism tends to encourage 
concerns about “national identity” and “nation-
al sovereignty.” Some EU citizens cling to these 
concepts as if they were actually capable of pro-
viding security in times of turmoil and uncer-
tainty (5). If one wants to convince people that 
such ideas are actually devoid of meaning, one 
will have to reiterate the reasons why greater 
European unity is a sensible political response 
in the context of multi-polar 21st century Eu-
rope and explain how such unity need to be 
organized in democratic terms. Many EU citi-
zens and the vast majority of EU governments 
prefer not to dwell on the difficulties involved. 
They would have to forgo something in order to 
make Europe a success, and they would also 
The future for the fifteen biggest market economies
Percentage share of the world economy in 2030.
2. 
USA
17.3 %
1. 
CHINA
23.8 %
3. 
EU27
14.3 %
MEXICO
1.5 %
CANADA
1.5 %
TURKEY
1.1 %
4. 
INDIA
10.4 %
JAPAN
3.6 %
RUSSIA
2.1 %
INDONESIA
2.0 %
BRAZIL
1.9 %
SOUTH KOREA
1.6 %
THAILAND
1.0 %
IRAN
1.0 %
AUSTRALIA
0.9 %
2010
Share of world economy
Prognosis in 2030, in %
growing
shrinking
Sources: IWF, Maddison 2007; IMF, September 2011 © Bertelsmann Stiftungs
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have to let go, in order to get a handle on things. 
People are slowly beginning to see that all this 
makes sense. Angela Merkel does, though she 
has spoken vaguely about it happening at some 
point in the future. Does Europe still have that 
much time?
Furthermore, half-hearted pragmatism fosters 
the financial markets’ mistrust. They sense that 
the intergovernmental method merely conceals 
a lack of willpower and a lack of resolve. Har-
vard economist Kenneth Rogoff, who, together 
with his colleague Carmen Reinhart, has re-
cently completed a study of the various finan-
cial crises that have taken place over the last 
eight hundred years, has issued this warning 
to Europeans: “the politicians who know what 
needs to be done say nothing because they are 
afraid of opposition from the electorate. But 
the pressure of the crisis may unleash a dy-
namism that we cannot imagine in our wildest 
dreams. In the end the United States of Europe 
may come about much faster than most peo-
ple think.” As far as Rogoff is concerned, the 
monetary union urgently needs “a central gov-
ernment and a finance minister. This Minister 
must be entitled to levy a significant number of 
taxes and to spend money, as he sees fit.” This 
can, at best, only be a first stepping stone to-
wards the United States of Europe. The estab-
lishment of such a polity would require more 
than a finance minister, even though he alone 
would no doubt enhance the Union’s economic 
clout. This in itself, would not necessarily rein-
force the Union’s democratic foundations.
Having been transformed into the United States 
of Europe, the European Union would continue 
to be defined by a rich heritage and the diver-
sity of its nations and regions. In this respect 
it would be quite different from the early days 
of the United States of America. And why not, 
one is tempted to ask, since federal structures 
such as those found in Austria, in Germany, in 
the United States and in Canada, are supposed 
to protect this kind of diversity. So it is not a 
question of “bigger is better” or “small is beau-
tiful,” but of a sensible and democratic way of 
arranging the body politic. The United States of 
Europe will unite nations and citizens and act 
as an antidote against “centralist temptation.” 
Where necessary it will supersede nations; it 
will not abolish them. The United States of Eu-
rope will always supersede the nation States in 
areas where the European federal government 
of the future is assigned responsibility for com-
mon public goods and resources, ranging from 
the internal market to competition and from 
currency to infrastructure policy (6).
This means that there will be a division of com-
petencies. From time to time, these will have 
to be reviewed and renegotiated by the Union 
and its Member States. Moreover, it may be pos-
sible to give a new lease of life to the old and 
lacklustre debate on European subsidiarity and 
to infuse this debate with new ideas. It will en-
able us to clarify where more Europe is needed 
and where less seems advisable, though this 
will have to be monitored on an ongoing basis, 
in order to remain abreast with new political 
developments.
A European Convention that meets at regular 
intervals and is made up of representatives 
from all EU Parliaments, governments and Eu-
ropean institutions might be helpful. Every five 
years, it might for example, ask pertinent ques-
tions of the European Legislature, the European 
Parliament such as: what has been done with 
our public goods? And has this been of any use 
to our polity? Such a division of labour does not 
have to replicate any of the above-mentioned 
federal models. They are, after all, based on 
rather different kinds of federalism. And in the 
interests of transparency, European federalism 
should not make the present EU structures 
even more complex or convoluted. “How” this 
is achieved is the question that is going to lie 
at the heart of the debate. At any rate, one can 
only warn against the adoption of the German 
model or indeed against an increasingly com-
plex EU federal structure, in view of the inher-
ent weaknesses associated with both.
The national governments no longer have the 
power to make decisions about the public goods 
of the Union. Whenever they try to do so, by 
means of the intergovernmental method and 
even if it can be plausibly argued that some-
thing needs to be done very urgently, the sub-
sequent question that then automatically arises 
is: who or what is going to exercise democratic 
control over their actions. Neither the German s
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Bundestag nor the French Assemblée nationale, 
for example, could exercise control over the 
financial conduct and debt related policies of 
the Greek and Italian governments. Moreover, 
the control exercised by the European Com-
mission, the European Parliament and the 
European Council, was to date, to no avail. It 
was much too weak and ineffective. This was 
the real reason why both the EU’s own citizens 
and the “markets” lost confidence in European 
policymaking. 
In this precarious situation, the call for the 
United States of Europe could be useful for two 
reasons. It could strengthen democratic legiti-
macy and potentially improve the relationship 
between EU citizens and the government. It 
could also bring about faster decision-making 
routes, which at long last, will become compre-
hensible for all concerned. For this the Union 
does not need new institutions. What it needs 
are new rules and regulations that govern the 
relationship between power and authority, rep-
resentation and participation. Complex, compli-
cated and chaotic. That is how many Europeans 
see this unfinished and imperfect Union. The 
word “Brussels” is a way of expressing a state 
of enduring political alienation. In order to 
change this state of affairs, the existing institu-
tions must be given the power to make com-
plex decisions with the kind of clarity that EU 
citizens can understand. Who does what? And 
who is responsible for what? These are ques-
tions which now need to be answered. Trust no 
longer emanates from good intentions and res-
olutions about self-discipline. Here once again, 
we see the shortcomings of the unfinished and 
imperfect architecture of the European Union.
 
IV  
Hamburg is not afraid of 
Bavaria
At any rate, the United States of Europe 
should not be a German project, for the sim-
ple reason that the geographical position and 
economic power of the most populous EU 
Member State, especially when it comes to 
the smaller countries, that is to say almost all 
other States, can easily spark a backlash and 
awaken fears of hegemony, “Merkozy,” and a 
German-dominated governing body.
Such instinctive reactions will disappear only 
if there is a federal framework. That at least is 
something that can be learnt from the Federal 
Republic of Germany. Hamburg does not have to 
be afraid of Bavaria merely because the south-
ern state has seven times as many inhabitants 
as the Free and Hanseatic City in the north. For 
this reason German politicians who are open-
minded about integration must begin immedi-
ately to try to win over their neighbours. There 
are of course comrades-in-arms, not only in the 
Executive, but also in the national parliaments, 
and of course in the European Parliament, 
where the cross party- and cross regional Spi-
nelli group, to name but one example, supports 
this strategy. In February 2012 the French em-
ployers’ association Medef came out in favour 
of the United States of Europe, supporting its’ 
endorsement of the United States of Europe 
with a number of interesting proposals (7). The 
debate will be a heated one. It also needs to be 
a European one. Once again we should see the 
opportunities and not only the obstacles. There 
is such a thing as a European public sphere, 
but it is multilingual and above all rather weak. 
And then there are the debates about the Eu-
ropeanization of political parties, electoral law 
and lists and citizens’ initiatives. As then, only 
a few people are interested in these things, but 
this may change.
When it comes to passionate disputes, much can 
be learnt from the American constitutional de-
bates that took place at the end of the eighteenth 
century. The historian Heinrich August Winkler 
has said of the United States of America that “in 
its early years the Union was not a firmly en-
trenched federal state, but a loose confederation.” 
When one reads this now, one rubs one’s eyes in 
disbelief. As the Americans tried to find the right 
way to shape their new polity, there were bitter 
disagreements and heated quarrels. As Winkler 
points out, the formation of a federal polity was 
the work of individual states which “continue to 
play a significant role in the Union.” The starting 
point for the European Union is rather different 
and in many ways far more favourable. Are EU 
citizens actually aware of this fact?s
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V  
Citizens want to be sure
German advocates of the United States of Eu-
rope face a number of challenges in their own 
country. Its citizens want to be sure they are 
doing the right thing, for the goal can be at-
tained only with the help of a large majority. 
The support of the media must also be secured, 
since the media forms part of the business of 
politics. Those who remember that virtually all 
of Germany’s leading media were totally op-
posed to the Treaty of Maastricht can now adopt 
a slightly more relaxed approach. Numerous 
editors have defended the euro. Political union 
does not frighten most leader writers. In fact, 
many of them find this hard to swallow, espe-
cially when certain individuals, who may well 
have a point when it comes to certain specific 
issues, go around pretending to be know alls. 
And then there is another great challenge - the 
judges of the German Constitutional Court 
in Karlsruhe. It is their stated wish and their 
bounden duty to protect Germany’s Basic Law 
(or Constitution) and democracy. According to 
constitutional judge Andreas Voßkuhle, Brus-
sels is nothing more than an “expertocracy.” 
And as far as these judges are concerned, the 
European Parliament in Strasbourg is not a par-
liament. The ruling of the Second Senate issued 
on 30 June 2009 in relation to the Treaty of Lis-
bon, states that “the unification of Europe in 
the shape of a treaty-based union of sovereign 
states may not proceed in such a way that there 
is no longer sufficient room within Member 
States for the political organization of economic, 
cultural and social life.” With this a general ca-
veat has been lodged by Germany, which placed 
future development of the Union under gener-
al suspicion. This can be used by High Court 
judges as and when they see fit. The judges 
of the Second Senate of the German Consti-
tutional Court are not however anti-European. 
They simply do not understand the entity that 
is referred to as the EU. It goes without saying 
that they know the Preamble of the Basic Law, 
which expressly instructs the German people 
“to serve world peace as an equal partner in a 
united Europe.” This can certainly be construed 
as “permission” and perhaps even a mandate 
for the establishment of the United States of Eu-
rope. They are also familiar with Article 33 of 
the Basic Law, which states: “with a view to es-
tablishing a united Europe, the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany shall participate in the develop-
ment of the European Union that is committed 
to democratic, social and federal principles, to 
the rule of law, and to the principle of subsidi-
arity and that guarantees a level of protection of 
basic rights, essentially comparable to that af-
forded by this Basic Law.” Yet the judges simply 
disregard these articles and arguments. They 
justify their ruling instead, referring to the 
concept of sovereignty, which is nowhere to be 
found in the Basic Law. In Germany the people 
are sovereign, not the State (8).
Now that all the large political parties in the 
German Parliament have come out in favour 
of a political union, and that one increasingly 
hears demands for the establishment of the 
United States of Europe, it seems that “at some 
point in the future” (as Merkel has put it) there 
is going to be a constitutional conflict. It is ar-
gued, that both sides probably know that this is 
the case and will make provisions accordingly. 
A situation, where the majority of the German 
Parliament and the German government want 
to take a decisive step towards a federal politi-
cal union, but are prevented from doing so by 
appointed and non-elected judges, who hand 
down decisions based upon a one-sided inter-
pretation of the facts, should not be tolerated. 
The appropriate democratic procedure would 
be to amend the Basic Law, which would make 
it impossible for judges to base their rulings on 
such interpretations.
How can demands for the establishment of the 
United States of Europe be formulated more 
precisely? The principal concepts are solidarity, 
security and strength. All three must be gener-
ated democratically and organized in an effec-
tive manner. All three will take pride of place in 
the debate, for which only a handful of princi-
ples will be defined.
European democracy needs to be strong. The 
national democracies, despite all of their dif-
ferences, are already strong and that is some-
thing that the EU can be proud of. Indeed, it 
has a duty to ensure that none of its Member s
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States do anything which might be detrimen-
tal to what has been achieved in this area to 
date. This emanates from Article 2 TEU. In ac-
cordance with article 7 TEU, whenever the val-
ues of the Union are infringed upon, the EU is 
also responsible for democracy at the national 
level. With regard to European democracy, Mer-
kel was quite right when she said that not a 
single institution needed to be re-invented on 
the federal level. However, the Commission 
and the European Parliament should be given 
the resources to enable EU citizens to see and 
experience European democracy at work, and 
above all to choose between different political 
alternatives.
The European economy needs to be solid. In 
the recent past the Member States have made 
it abundantly clear that they lack the req-
uisite seriousness in this area. They are also 
simply not ambitious enough. An economy is 
in good shape if it keeps unemployment down 
and enhances its level of competitiveness. It is 
also more likely to be secure if it promotes a 
social market economy (as set out in the trea-
ties), confronts the challenges brought about by 
global competition and mass natural resources 
consumption. These are familiar tasks that 
should have been tackled a long time ago. The 
Union will not be successful, particularly in a 
multi-polar global economy, if it is not placed 
on a secure footing.
There is no shortage of ideas in Europe. The 
fact of the matter is that they are not being im-
plemented. Unfortunately the 27 fragmented 
national economic policies are simply not up to 
the job. An example of this is as follows. The 
EU 2020 strategy with its three goals of smart, 
sustainable and inclusive growth certainly 
makes sense. Its oversight by the EU Commis-
sion will continue however to be weak, as long 
as its competences are fragmented and divided 
between half a dozen Commissioners and their 
directorates-general. Those who wish to see the 
European Union succeed during the course of 
this decade see that the EU clearly needs (more) 
leadership. Fiscal, economic, competition and 
budgetary policy should be in the hands of one 
individual in Brussels, or, to put it more suc-
cinctly, in the hands of a truly European Minis-
ter for Economic and Financial Affairs. This is 
where Rogoff’s proposal that there should be a 
finance minister, who is empowered to levy a 
Trade before and after the crisis
Trade development in a selection of market economies, 2006 - 2010 in Billions, US Dollars.
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significant number of taxes, comes into its own. 
“No taxation without representation” was a slo-
gan that was bandied about in the early years 
of the United States of America. In the Euro-
pean Union the opposite would seem to be true, 
i.e. representation without taxation. Unlike its 
Member States, the Union is not permitted to 
incur debt and is as a result, debt-free. Those 
who wish to transform the EU into the United 
States of Europe do not have to change this, but 
they will need more financial resources, than 
are currently available.
The co-existence of half a billion people must 
be based on the kind of solidarity alluded to in 
Article 3 paragraph 3 of the Treaty of Lisbon, 
which stipulates that the Union “shall promote 
economic, social and territorial cohesion” and 
“solidarity among Member States.” The term sol-
idarity has been an integral part of European 
thought for centuries. This is what the French 
Revolution called fraternité, and what Christian-
ity is referring to, when it states that human 
beings are brothers and sisters. Since the Trea-
ties of Rome solidarity has been a key concept 
in the European treaties. There is evidently a 
lack of solidarity, in cases where agreements 
are broken for reasons of self-interest. In a gen-
uine union, this cannot go unpunished. No mat-
ter what the punishment is, it will inevitably 
involve rules and regulations as well as money. 
The current debate on this subject ranges from 
a temporary loss of voting rights to the cancel-
lation of subsidies.
The EU is an internal market for capital and 
goods and to a lesser extent for labour. The Er-
asmus Programme has made it easy for a whole 
generation of students to move freely within 
this market. However, as soon as a student has 
found a job, the obstacles being to surface and 
as (s)he moves around within the internal mar-
ket, (s)he is confronted with 27 different and 
fragmented labour markets (9). Proposals relat-
ing to the European Social Area, a by-product 
of the internal market and a concrete manifes-
tation of the much-vaunted European social 
market economy, have in the past tended to 
be a source of anxiety. Yet whether it wishes 
to do so or not, the Union will have to concern 
itself with issues such as vocational training, 
qualification criteria, social protection and the 
pension arrangements of Member States. The 
recent economic governance reforms have cer-
tain social ramifications, especially when wage 
share ratio, pensionable age and employment 
levels among the Youth, older persons and 
women are to be explained by means of com-
mon yardsticks. This will have to be configured 
in social terms, that is to say politically negoti-
ated to include all participants. Such experienc-
es will nudge the Union closer in the direction 
of the United States of Europe. However, the 
guiding principle must be convergence and not 
harmonization. Those who talk about economic 
government cannot be allowed to forget about 
Social Europe. Those who want to strengthen 
the polity as a whole must also strengthen the 
competitiveness of the Member States.
VI  
Is it a transfer union? No. It is a 
transformation union!
The forthcoming Union will continue to be a 
transfer union, though at a reasonable level. 
The experience of the German fiscal equaliza-
tion scheme, in which the weak states merely 
receive assistance from the strong, suggests 
that it would be better to adopt a different 
system, at the European level. Every transfer 
union should contribute to the transformation 
union, helping to shape change both in Europe 
(and that includes demographic factors) and 
further afield. A number of ideas have already 
been discussed to this end, although experts 
(and politicians) will have to do more to make 
them more widely known. The goal was defined 
by the Union a long time ago. It must now be 
given the means with which to attain same. 
Article 3, paragraph 3 of the consolidated Trea-
ties of the EU, as amended by the Treaty of 
Lisbon states: “The Union shall establish an 
internal market. It shall work for the sustain-
able development of Europe based on balanced 
economic growth and price stability, a highly 
competitive social market economy aiming at 
full employment and social progress and a high 
level of protection and improvement of the qual-
ity of the environment. It shall promote scien-s
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tific and technological advance. It shall combat 
social exclusion and discrimination, and shall 
promote social justice and protection, equality 
between women and men, solidarity between 
generations and protection of the rights of the 
child. It shall promote economic, social and ter-
ritorial cohesion and solidarity among Member 
States. It shall respect its rich cultural and lin-
guistic diversity, and shall ensure that Europe’s 
cultural heritage is safeguarded and enhanced.”
These seem to be the beliefs and values which 
hold Europe and Europeans together. It would 
indeed be good if they continued to be honed 
and enhanced further. European instruments 
and institutions are far too weak for this.
A lack of democratic control is far more seri-
ous than a lack of (economic) policy efficiency. 
Article 121 TFEU contains a glaring example of 
this: “The Council shall, on a recommendation 
from the Commission, formulate a draft for the 
broad guidelines of the economic policies of the 
Member States and of the Union and shall re-
port its findings to the European Council. The 
European Council shall, acting on the basis of 
the report from the Council, discuss a conclu-
sion on the broad guidelines of the economic 
policies of the Member States and of the Un-
ion. On the basis of this conclusion, the Council 
shall adopt a recommendation setting out these 
broad guidelines. The Council shall inform the 
European Parliament of its recommendation.” 
The national parliaments are not even men-
tioned. And the prerequisite to “inform” saves 
one the trouble of putting the matter to a vote. 
This can hardly be called democratic control.
Effectiveness and control are the two main 
tasks facing the Union, which considers the Eu-
ropean economy to be a common good and its 
policymaking as common democratic practice. 
So far, the EU has failed to do either of these 
things, fuelling feelings of mistrust and scepti-
cism among ordinary citizens.
More cannot be achieved with the existing poli-
ty. The European Union is tethering at the Unit-
ed States of Europe threshold. If it dithers, it 
will have to pay a steep price for its indecision. 
On the other hand, taking the next step forward 
should of course, not be entered into lightly. But 
it needs to be done and it needs to be done now 
with solidarity, security and strength as its 
stated goals. For this reason, every democratic 
debate is worth having. s
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Annotations:
1  Since 2009 the Bertelsmann Stiftung has supported the idea of establishing the United States of 
Europe. However, the philosopher Hermann Lübbe and the former Constitutional Court judge Paul 
Kirchhof reject these proposals. See: 
http://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/wirtschaftspolitik/im-gespraech-paul-kirchhof-vereinigte-staaten-von-europa-
wird-es-nicht-geben-1811736.html
2  http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/bundeskanzlerin-gibt-interview-zur-europapolitik-merkel-will-europas-
wirtschaft-ankurbeln-1.1266583
3  http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,782879,00.html   
and:  
http://www.focus.de/politik/weitere-meldungen/fdp-westerwelle-will-die-vereinigten-staaten-von-europa-noch-
erleben_aid_657425.html
4  Habermas is in favour of a transnational democracy and against the model provided by the United 
States. It is not entirely clear why this should constitute an obstacle when it comes to setting up a  
“cosmopolitan (community) of states and global citizens.”
5  A Zeit-Online survey conducted in September 2011 revealed that 44 percent of French interviewees, 35 
percent of German interviewees and 13 percent of British interviewees believe that the United States of 
Europe is a suitable model “in the long term.”
6  www.stefancollignon.de/PDF/Die_EU_als_Republik.pdf .  
Collignon provides updates on his intriguing republican alternative to the United States of Europe. Both 
approaches want to develop the Union in democratic terms (as do Franzius and Preuß). The differences 
cannot be discussed here.
7  In February Italian prime minister Mario Monti and French MEP Sylvie Goulard stated in Le Monde and 
the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung that they want more democracy in Europe “on all levels,” without 
(or perhaps already?) advocating in favour of the United States of Europe, though maybe not stating as 
much in so many words. 
http://www.spinelligroup.eu/tag/mario-monti/
8  Hans-Gert Pöttering, the former Speaker of the European Parliament and current Chairman of the 
Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 17 February 2012, p. 8.
9  These arguments have been advanced by Medef, the French employers’ union. See: 
www.besoindaire.com/pdf.htmls
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Further Reading:
Guy Verhofstadt: Die vereinigten Staaten von Europa. Manifest für ein neues Europa, Grenz-Echo Verlag, 
2007. The book was first published in Flemish in November 2005 and the English edition in 2006.
Claudio Franzius/Ulrich K.Preuß: Die Zukunft der Europäischen Demokratie. Heinrich Böll Stiftung. 2012.  
The authors wish to promote the cause of democracy on the basis of the Treaty of Lisbon.
Jürgen Habermas: Zur Verfassung Europas, Frankfurt am Main 2011, p.7. 
Interview with Kenneth Rogoff, Der Spiegel, 8/2012. p.81.
Rainer Hank: Wider die Vereinigten Staaten von Europa, Merkur 1/2012, p.9.
Medef: Besoin d‘Aire,
www.besoindaire.com/pdf.html
Heinrich August Winkler: Geschichte des Westens, Vol. 1, Munich, 2009, p. 285. See also p. 304 on the 
subject of federalism.
Joachim Fritz-Vannahme: Europas neue Story, Spotlight Europe, April 2009. This led to a debate at the Hein-
rich Böll Stiftung, the results of which were later published under the title Solidarität und Stärke – Zur Zukunft 
der Europäischen Union. See also: 
http://www.boell.de/internationalepolitik/europatransatlantik/europa-transatlantik-dossier-zukunft-der-eu-13073.html
Bertelsmann Stiftung (ed): Solidarity: For sale, Europe in Dialogue, 2012/01.  
http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/cps/rde/xbcr/bst/Europe_in_Dialogue_01_2012_Solidarity.pdfs
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